

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

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EUR-10 PM-03 INR-10 NSC-07 CIAE-00 DRC-01 RSC-01 /057 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0182

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INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 SECTIONS MBFR VIENNA 0105

LIMDIS

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: UK PAPER ON NUCLEAR
ISSUES

REF: (A) LONDON 7340(LIMDIS); (B) MBFR VIENNA 0078;
(C)VIENNA 3246; (D) STATE 58830 KLIMDIS)

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: WE ARE CONCERNED OVER THE TREND
OF UK AND FRG THINKING ON USE OF NUCLEAR ELEMENT
IN MBFR, AS EXEMPLIFIED IN FRG/UK OFFICIAL LEVEL
PAPER ON MBFR NUCLEAR ISSUES CONTAINED IN REF (A).
THAT PAPER IS HIGHLY UNREALISTIC. IT LOOKS AT THE
NUCLEAR ISSUE SOLELY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF
WESTERN DESIDERATA. IT APPEARS TO BE BASED ON
THE UNSTATED ASSUMPTION THAT THE ALLIES CAN
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READILY ACHIEVE THEIR FIRST PHASE REDUCTION GOAL

AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY, THE REAL PROBLEM IS TO ESTABLISH WHAT ADDITIONAL THINGS THEY SHOULD ASK FOR FROM THE EAST IN RETURN FOR THE CONTENT OF OPTION III. THIS VIEW DOES NOT CORRESPOND TO THE NEGOTIATING REALITIES. IT FAILS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONCRETE NEGOTIATING SITUATION OR COME TO GRIPS WITH THE PROBLEM OF HOW THE ALLIES CAN PERSUADE THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT THE HIGHLY ASYMMETRICAL CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS ALLIES HAVE PROPOSED.

2. THE EVIDENCE OF FURTHER HARDENING OF UK AND FRG VIEWS IN THIS UNREALISTIC PAPER MAKES US CONCERNED THAT FURTHER DELAY IN DISCUSSING SPECIFICS OF USE OF OPTION III IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WILL RESULT IN CONSOLIDATING AND INCREASING WESTERN EUROPEAN OPPOSITION TO NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS IN MBFR. CONSEQUENTLY, WE RECOMMEND AS FIRST STEP THAT EMBASSIES BONN AND LONDON BE AUTHORIZED TO CONVEY PRELIMINARY US REACTIONS TO UK AND FRG ALONG LINES INDICATED BEOW. AS SECOND STEP, WE RECOMMEND THAT USG SHOULD DECIDE INTERNALLY ON BEST COURSE FOR TACTICAL USE OF OPTION III CONTENT IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT THIS WORK SHOULD BEGIN NOW. AS THEIR STEP, WE PROPOSE THAT US SHOULD HOLD FURTHER CONSULTATION WITH UK AND FRG AND SEEK THEIR AGREEMENT TO THE CONTENT OF PRIOR, SPECIFIC USG DECISION ON TACTICS. WE THINK IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO HOLD FURTHER CONSULTATION BEFORE US HAS DEFINITE POSITION ON TACTICS SINCE TO DO SO WOULD GIVE DECIDED ADVANTAGE TO NEGATIVE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED IN UK PAPER WITHOUT US PARTICIPANTS HAVING A POSITIVE POSITION FROM WHICH TO SPEAK. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE, AS STATED IN REFS (B) AND (C), THAT ALLIED CHANCES OF OBTAINING SOVIET AGREEMENT TO THE ALLIED PHASE I REDUCTION PACKAGE DEPEND ON INTRODUCING OPTION III INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS AND DOING SO IN THE NEAR FUTURE. END SUMMARY.

3. FRG/UK OFFICIAL LEVEL PAPER ON MBFR NUCLEAR ISSUES
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APPEARS TO RELECT THE SAME BASIC PREOCCUPATIONS AS THOSE VOICED BY THE GERMANS AND THE BRITICH AT THE WASHINGTON TRILATERAL DISCUSSION ON MARCH 18 (REF D). ALTHOUGH THE FRG/UK PAPER AVOIDS REACHING ANY EXPLICIT CONCLUSIONS, IT APPEARS TO REFLECT AN UNDERLYING VIEW (A) THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD DEMAND RECIPROCITY FOR US NUCLEAR WITHDRAWALS, POSSIBLY IN THE FORM OF REDUCTION IN PACT NUCLEAR SYSTEMS; (B) THAT INCLUSION OF US

DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT IN REDUCTIONS IS PROBABLY UNDESIRABLE; AND (C) THAT THE NUCLEAR ELEMENTS SHOULD PREFERABLY BE USED TO SECURE EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE WHOLE OF THE ALLIED MBFR PROGRAM, INCLUDING BOTH PHASE I AND PHASE II REDUCTIONS.

4. LOOKED AT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS, THESE VIEW APPEAR UNREALISTIC, IN THAT THEY FAIL TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SOVIET NEGOTIATING PRIORITIES, A SUBJECT ON WHICH AFTER NEARLY EIGHT MONTHS OF NEGOTIATIONS A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF EVIDENCE HAS BEEN DEVELOPED. THEY ALSO APPEAR TO EVIDENCE CONFUSION AS TO WHAT THE MAIN ALLIED NEGOTIATING PRIORITIES ARE.

5. THE UNDERLYING LOGIC OF THE AGREED ALLIED NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL IS THAT THE EXISTING IMBALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL (GROUND) FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE SHOULD BE CORRECTED. IT IS THE SOVIET PREPONDERANCE IN MEN AND TANKS IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHICH THE ALLIES FIND THREATENING AND WISH TO REDUCE OR ELIMINATE THROUGH AN ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTION OF SOVIET MEN AND TANKS IN PHASE I, PLUS AN EASTERN COMMITMENT TO FURTHER ASYMMETRICAL GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II. IF THIS CAN BE DONE, THE US WITHDRAWALS AND ALLIED REDUCTIONS WOULD BE JUSTIFIED.

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ACTION ACDA-10

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LIMDIS

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

6. IT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE LOGIC OF THIS
APPROACH TO USE THE NUCLEAR BARGAINING CHIP FOR
NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS ON THE EASTERN SIDE. TO THE
EXTENT THAT THE ALLIES SEEK TO MAFVVZCZ

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

13. FYI: UK REP (ROSE) ON PERSONAL BASIS, PLEASE
PROTECT, HAS STATED THAT HE AGREES COMPLETELY WITH
THIS VIEW AND HAS SO STATED TO LONDON IN COMMENTS
ON UK-FRG PAPER. HE OPPOSES ASKING SOVIETS FOR ANY
NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS. HE FAVORS REQUESTING ONLY SOVIET
NUCLEAR FREEZE. HE BELIEVES TICKELL NOW CONCURS WITH
HIS VIEW. END FYI.

14. WE RECOMMEND THAT WASHINGTON AUTHORIZE EMBASSIES

LONDON AND BONN TO TELL BRITISH AND GERMANS BILATERALLY,
DRAWING ON CONSIDERATIONS OUTLINED ABOVE: (A) THAT
REDUCTION OR ELIMINATION OF DISPARITY IN CONVENTIONAL
GROUND FORCES IS THE PRIORITY ALLIED GOAL, AND
WESTERN NUCLEAR LEVERAGE SHOULD BE APPLIED TO THIS
OBJECTIVE, NOT TO SEEKING SOVIET NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS;
(B) THAT US BELIEVES IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO USE

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OPTION III TO OBTAIN IN PHASE I ASYMMETRICAL US-
SOVIET GROUND FORCE MANPOWER REDUCTIONS AND THE
WITHDRAWAL OF 1,700 SOVIET TANKS IN THE FORM OF A
TANK ARMY; (C) THAT IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO USE THE
WHOLE OF OPTION III TO OBTAIN THESE PHASE I OBJECTIVES;
(D) THAT EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING
CONCEPT, WHICH IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE WEST, WILL BE
CONSIDERABLY EASIER TO ACHIEVE IF WEST HAS FIRST
GAINED EASTERN ACCEPTANCE IN PRACTICE OF ASYMMETRICAL
GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS AS APPLIED TO OUR PROPOSED
PHASE I REDUCTION OBJECTIVES; AND (E) THAT WE SHOULD
IN THE MEANWHILE ALSO FOLLOW THE COURSE OF SEEKING TO
ASCERTAIN THROUGH EAST-WEST DISCUSSIONS OF THE
DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES AND OF DATA WHETHER SOME
ADJUSTMENTS IN OUR PRESENT UNDERSTANDING OF THE
DISPARITY IN THE OVERALL GROUND FORCE STRENGTHS OF
BOTH SIDES ARE IN ORDER. FYI: WE RECOGNIZE THAT A
MAJOR CURRENT PROBLEM IS TO
CONVINCE THE ALLIES THAT US WILL NOT ABANDON COMMON
CEILING OBJECTIVE IF CONTENT OF OPTION III IS USED
TOWARD WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TANK ARMY. POINTS (D) AND
(E) ABOVE MAY BE OF SOME HELP IN THIS CONNECTION.

END FYI.

15. THE EMERGING SOVIET INSISTENCE ON EQUALITY
OF REDUCTIONS WITH THE US, TOGETHER WITH THE
INCREASING EASTERN HINTS OF WILLINGNESS TO DEFER
NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS TO A LATER PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS,
ARGUES IN OUR VIEW FOR INTRODUCING THE NUCLEAR
ELEMENT IN THE NEAR FUTURE RATHER THAN POSTPONING IT,
AS UK AND FRG SEEM TO PREFER. THIS IS BECAUSE THE
ALLIES COULD BE FACED WITH AN AWKWARD SITUATION IF
THE SOVIETS, AS A "CONCESSION" TO THE FREQUENTLY
EXPRESSED ALLIED OPPOSITION TO INCLUSION OF AIR AND
NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WERE TO OFFER TO DEFER CONSIDERATION
OF THEM TO A SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATING PHASE. SUCH A
PROPOSAL WOULD APPEAR TO BE A CONCESSION TO THE ALLIED
POSITION, BUT IT WOULD IN FACT BE TACTICALLY ADVERSE
TO THE ALLIES. IF IT WERE ACCEPTED, WHEN THE NEGOTIATIONS
THEN CAME TO FOCUS ON THE SIZE AND CONTENT OF REDUCTIONS,
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THE ALLIES WOULD NO LONGER HAVE AN OPENING FOR INTRODUCING THE NUCLEAR BARGAINING CHIP AS A MEANS OF MOVING THE SOVIETS AWAY FROM THEIR INSISTENCE ON EQUAL (OR EQUAL PERCENTAGE) GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS AND BRINGING THEM TOWARD ASYMMETRICAL GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS.

16. WE BELIEVE IN SHORT THAT OUR HARDES NEGOTIATING TASK WILL BE TO OBTAIN SOVIET AGREEMENT TO SIGNIFICANTLY LARGER PHASE I GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS THAN THE US, THAT THE WHOLE OF OPTION III WILL NEED TO BE APPLIED AGAINST THIS OBJECTIVE, AND THAT THERE ARE RISKS IN TOO LONG DELAYING THE INTRODUCTION OF OPTION III INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE BELIEVE IT WORTHWHILE MAKING THESE POINTS BILATERALLY TO THE BRITISH AND GERMANS NOW, IN AN EFFORT TO CREATE MORE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR THE ADOPTION BY THE ALLIES OF OPTION III, ONCE WASHINGTON HAS DETERMINED THAT CONDITIONS ARE RIPE FOR ITS INTRODUCTION INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS.

17. WE BELIEVE ALSO THAT THE US SHOULD DEVELOP ITS OWN POSITION ON USE OF OPTION III IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AND BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE WITH THE ALLIES IN SPECIFIC RATHER THAN ABSTRACT TERMS BEFORE FURTHER TRILATERAL DISCUSSIONS OF NUCLEARS ARE HELD. THE DELEGATION WILL SHORTLY FORWARD RECOMMENDATIONS ON POSSIBLE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEARS. RESOR

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